Henry Kissinger writes in the International Herald Tribune that "Withdrawal Is Not An Option," an honest assessment of some of the mistakes in the Iraq War, but more importantly, looking forward, analysis of the consequences of withdrawal that demonstrates the problem thinking of those urging such a course. Earlier, in a discussion of the shocking honesty of UPI reporter Pam Hess, I wrote:
From Jack Murtha to the NY Times, no politician that advocates any form of withdrawal from Iraq, and none of the reflexively Bush-opposed media who report those proposals seem to seriously consider that topic. Their thoughts seem to stop at "Well, it couldn't be any worse than it already is." That's a fallacy, though, because of course it could be worse. Ms. Hess has seen it. "But we're not asking the central national security question, because it seems that if as a reporter you do ask the national security question, all of a sudden you're carrying Bush's water." Why would that be the case, he wonders, knowing the answer.
The answer to the question is, and can only be, that losing would be a disaster for America and a huge boost to the extremist Islamic terrorists. If you consider that question, and honestly give an answer to it, then such suggestions as immediate withdrawal to Okinawa or timetables not based upon circumstances in Iraq become transparent idiocy of the highest order.
Mr. Kissinger agrees, writing that American forces are "indispensible." "They are not in Iraq as a favor to its government... They are there as an expression of the American national interest..." He looks at the supposed withdrawal options, and finds them lacking.
An abrupt American departure will greatly complicate efforts to help stem the terrorist tide far beyond Iraq; fragile governments from Lebanon to the Gulf will be tempted into pre-emptive concessions. It might drive the sectarian conflict within Iraq to genocidal dimensions.
Graduated withdrawal would not ease these dangers until a different strategy is in place and shows some progress. For now, it would be treated both within Iraq and in the region as the forerunner of a total withdrawal. President Bush's decision should therefore be seen as the first step toward a new grand strategy relating power to diplomacy for the entire region, ideally on a nonpartisan basis.
A non-partisan basis would be preferable, but Democrats have made too much hay bashing the Bush administration moves without being required to either consider the consequences of not following them or offer their own alternatives. Mr. Kissinger sees four items worthy of attention, and rightly urges Mr. al-Maliki's government to find solutions to two of them.
Of the current security threats in Iraq — the intervention of outside countries, the presence of Qaeda fighters, an extraordinarily large criminal element, the sectarian conflict — the United States has a national interest in defeating the first two; it must not involve itself in the sectarian conflict for any extended period, much less let itself be used by one side for its own sectarian goals.
A truly united national government can have only one military, a national one, and raging Sunni and Shiite militias must be made toothless if not eliminated. Even the NY Times recognized this reality.
Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, has a problem. His power depends on two armies. One is Iraq’s national army, trained and supported by the United States. The other is the Mahdi Army, a radical Shiite militia loyal to Mr. Maliki’s most powerful political backer, Moktada al-Sadr.
This week, open warfare broke out between these two armies. Mr. Maliki can no longer put off making an essential choice. He can choose to be the leader of a unified Iraqi government, or he can choose to be the captive of a radical Shiite warlord. He can no longer pretend to be both.
The recent efforts of the Iraqi government to shake up the Mahdi army have been encouraging. Obviously they must continue. Mr. al-Maliki will not require similar convincing to disarm the Sunnis.
Mr. Kissinger does highlight some of the mistakes that led us to where we are, though in looking at them they seemed to be reasonable choices at the time.
The reliance on early elections as the key to political evolution, in a country lacking a sense of national identity, caused the newly enfranchised to vote almost exclusively for sectarian parties, deepening historic divisions into chasms.
The understandable — but, in retrospect, premature — strategy of replacing American with indigenous forces deflected U.S. forces from a military mission; nor could it deal with the most flagrant shortcoming of Iraqi forces, which is to define what the Iraqi forces are supposed to fight for and under what banner.
And the decision to allow such sectarian militias as the Mahdi army to exist and strengthen has been a major flaw. Still, the problem is solvable, if only the American people and its leadership and the leadership in Iraq have the resolve to avoid quitting while the going is tough and the toughness to do what needs to be done.
